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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. JAMISON, SR., 
et a l . , 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v s . 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Using Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) U .C .A . a s authority, Respondent, 
Donald Jamison, J r . , sought to recover from Appellant, Utah Home Fire 
Insurance Company, reimbursement expenses of $12.00 per day for loss of 
services which he a l legedly , normally performed for his household, but 
which he was unable to perform due to injuries incurred in an automobile 
acc iden t . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 10, 1976, the Utah District Court, Third Judicial Distr ict , 
citing Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) a s authority and holding that it applied to minor 
children, awarded Respondent $12.00 a day reimbursement expenses for loss 
of s e rv i ce s . The $12.00 a day award covered a 112 day period between 
November 19, 1974 to March 1 1 , 1975, thus totaling $ 1 , 3 4 4 . 0 0 . To this 
figure the Court a l so allowed Respondent interest a t an eighteen (18%) percent 
annual rate dated from May 22, 1975, cos t s incurred in the legal ac t ion , and 
a t torney 's fees for the sum of $475.00 . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the decision of the lower Court reversed and 
further relief granted a s appears equitable to the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 19, 1974, Donald J. Jamison, J r . , a twelve-year old 
boy, incurred injury when, while riding his b icyc le , he was struck by an 
automobile driven by Utah Home Fire Insurance Company's insured. A Court 
approved sett lement covering Jamison1 s medical expenses and personal 
injury claim was reached between Donald Jamison, Sr. , a s guardian ad li tem, 
for his son and Utah Home Fire. But then, using Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) a s 
authori ty, Respondents brought suit against Utah Home Fire claiming $12.00 
a day reimbursement expenses for loss of household services normally 
performed by the injured boy. 
At t r ia l , Donald Jamison, J r . , claimed he previously performed the 
following household services which consumed the following estimated amounts 
of time: 
1 . Took out the garbage daily - two to three minutes per day . (R.37) 
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2. Cleaned his room daily - five minutes per day . (R. at 39) 
3 . Washed dishes two or three times a week - fifteen to twenty 
minutes per t ime, (R. at 37) 
4 . Vacuum carpet three or four times a week - fifteen to twenty 
minutes per t ime. (R. at 38) 
5 . Helped mother carry in groceries from car each Friday - no time 
specif ied. (R. at 40) 
6 . Washed the car in the summer once every week or two - no time 
specif ied. (R. at 33) 
The injured Jamison boy lived in an apartment so there were no outside 
chores to be done . (R. at 13) 
Admittedly, he had two teenage s is ters who# along with his non-working 
mother, a s s i s t ed with the inside chores . (R. at 37) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXTENDED THE COVERAGE 
OF SECTION 31-41-6(b)(ii) BY INTERPRETING IT TO PROVIDE 
REIMBURSEMENT EXPENSES OF $12.00 PER DAY FOR LOSS OF A 
MINOR'S SERVICES, EVEN WHEN THOSE SERVICES WERE NOT 
REASONABLY WORTH $12 .00 . 
Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) reads as follows: 
In lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been 
reasonably incurred for services that , but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for his household and 
regardless of whether any of these expenses are actually 
incurred, an al lowance of $12.00 per day commencing not 
later than three (3) days after the date of the injury and 
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continuing for a maximum of 365 days thereafter. . . . 
Two interpretations are possible. The above statute may be read - as 
was done by the trial Court - to award a flat $12.00 a day regardless of the 
person1 s injury or the value of the services he performed. On the other hand, 
it may be read to reimburse for expenses at a suggested figure of $12.00 a day 
provided $12.00 is the reasonable value of the services which the injured party 
would have performed/ but for his injury. The first interpretation is without 
merit; the second is controlling. 
To read $12.00 a day as a flat figure to be awarded regardless of the 
value of the services performed may not be permitted for three reasons. It 
would (1) contravene the dual purpose of No-Fault legislation; (2) result in 
devastating practical ramifications; (3) be internally inconsistent with 
Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) itself. 
1. Contravene s Purpose of No-Fault Statute. Utah's No-Fault 
Compensation System has a dual purpose. One i s , of course, to compensate 
an injured person for actual loss he incurs due to injuries he personally or a 
member of h is family suffers because of an automobile accident. The legislature 
did not intend to provide a windfall for anyone; rather, actual loss was the 
criterion used. Utah's No-Fault legislation is replete with examples. 
Section 31-41-7(3) provides for a formula to arise at actual loss . It reduces 
No-Fault benefits by any Workmen's Compensation or military benefits which 
the injured person receives. Section 31-41-6(d)(2) gives explicit instruction 
to be used in determining "reasonable value" of medical expenses. Also, 
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Section 31-31-6(b) al lows disabil i ty benefits to cover eighty-five (85%) 
percent of lost wages . In short, a s the No-Fault Act read in i ts entirety 
makes abundantly c lear , a major purpose behind No-Fault legislation is to 
compensate an accident victim for ac tua l , not speculative or potential l o s s e s . 
A second purpose behind passage of the No-Fault Act was to reduce 
overall insurance c o s t s , thus saving the public money in the form of reduced 
premiums. In fact, the public provided impetus fpr the passage of No-Fault 
laws by their outcry for lower premium r a t e s . 
Woodruff, Feca, Squillanta in their current t reat ise on No-Fault entitled 
Automobile Insurance in No-Fault Law summarized the findings of numerous 
s tudies in public opinion p o l l s . They stated their summary in these words: 
Probably the biggest concern of the general public is for 
lower premiums, which various No-Fault plans were 
supposed to accomplish. . . . p .400 
The public fs motives were a l so reflected by their l eg is la tors . The 
Insurance Subcommittee of the Utah Legislature, in studying No-Fault proposals 
and finally drafting Utah fs No-Fault S ta tu tes , reiterated i ts concern over 
spiraling insurance c o s t s . This concern was not only amply evident in written 
minutes of i ts Minutes (see Minutes of the Insurance Subcommittee, 1971-1972) 
but a l so found explicit statutory s ta tement . Section 31-41-2 in stat ing the 
purpose of the No-Fault Act reads in part: 
. . .The intention of legislat ion is hereby to possibly s tab i l i ze , 
if not effectuate certain savings in , the rising cos ts of au to -
mobile accident insurance . . . . 
The recent spiraling cost of malpractice insurance graphically i l lus t ra tes 
the dangers which the legislature attempted to guard agains t by enactment of 
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the No-Fault l a w s . The public suffers when insurance cos t s become exorbitant 
s ince the insurer must, in order to remain in b u s i n e s s , pas s those spiraling 
cos t s on to i ts insureds via higher premiums. The legislature felt that No-Fault 
could remedy this si tuation by eliminating inflated small claims caused by 
high damage jury awards , and yet preserve a tort remedy for very serious 
injuries for which insurance limits might st i l l be inadequate . (See Minutes 
of the Insurance Subcommittee, November 3rd, Hulbert Presentation; see a l so 
Keeton and O'Connell , Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965) p . 268 
through 271.) 
Keeping the above two purposes of No-Fault Legislation in mind, it is 
incomprehensible to conclude that the legis lators would openly express these 
two purposes - compensate for ac tual loss , keep premium cos ts down - and 
then attempt to destroy those very purposes by providing windfall payments of 
$12.00 per day to parents of minor children. Were the Court to mandate t h i s , 
an insurance company would certainly not be compensating even an assemblance 
of ac tual damages . It would simply be making gratuitous payments to unde-
serving rec ip ien t s . Moreover, No-Fault could never become a "money saver" 
if every parent of a minor child injured in an automobile accident may be 
awarded $12.00 a day or up to $ 4 , 3 8 0 . 0 0 . The vas t aggregate of these potentia 
sums would , of neces s i t y , be shifted to the public via higher premium c o s t . 
To summarize, the over-riding purposes of Utah 's No-Fault Statutes 
prohibit reading $12.00 a day a s an unchangeable figure to be awarded regardles 
of c i rcumstances . 
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2. Devastating Practical Ramifications . Giving Respondent 
every benefit of the doubt, his services st i l l consumed less than thirty 
minutes per day . This makes the hourly funds received by Respondent's 
parents for loss of his services in excess of $24.00 per hour. This is 
certainly an unearned, unwarranted windfall. Such a sum is even more 
incongruous when one considers that the average wage for a day worker in 
Utah is between $2.50 and $3.00 per hour. (Domestic Division, Utah 
Department of Employment Security.) 
The legislature certainly did not intend such a paradoxical s i tuat ion. 
It i s absurd to conclude that it intended to lavish $12 .00 a day upon the 
parents of a twelve-year old boy for loss of his se rv ices , when the boy's 
services took l e s s than thirty minutes a day and consis ted merely of occasional 
vacuuming, washing d i s h e s , empting garbage and straightening his room. 
If Respondent i s allowed $12.00 for the miniscule services which he performed, 
it would seem that any minor performing any kind of service would be 
eligible for $12.00 a day reimbursement expenses . For example, the 
e ight-year old boy who merely made his bed each day could net his parents 
$12.00 a day for up to a year . Or, the three-year old infant who spent a 
couple of minutes each day picking up his toys could, by suffering an injury 
claim payment of $12.00 per day. 
To avoid such anomal ies , the Court must not read $12.00 a day a s 
a flat figure awardable regardless of c i rcumstances . 
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3 . Internally Inconsistent with Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) i tself . 
Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) is based upon the premise that a person receiving $12.00 
per day i s being reimbursed for expenses which would have been incurred for 
the services which except for the injury sus ta ined , the recipient would have 
performed. Webster ' s Dictionary defines reimbursed a s meaning Jlto replace 
in a purse an equivalent for that taken, lost or expended; hence , to pay back; 
repay. f l If the legislature intended a gift or windfall, it could have used the 
words "gift" or "windfall" in i ts s t a tu te . Ins tead, it used the word "reimbursed. 
The word clearly means to pay back an amount equivalent to that which was los t . 
Moreover, Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) provides payments for "expenses which 
would have been reasonably incurred for services that the injured person would 
have performed. The word reasonably i s the key word here . The statute was 
designed to allow payment for services that a housewife performs for her house -
hold when a disabling injury prevented her from so performing. When read in 
this light Section 31-41-6(b)(ii) is reasonable . The statute is totally unreasonab 
if read to require $12.00 a day payment to a twelve-year old who spends a few 
minutes a day washing dishes occas ional ly , vacuuming occas ional ly , taking the 
garbage out , and making his bed . Such a reading being totally unreasonable, 
would make the expressed statutory requirement of reasonableness a dead le t ter . 
In short , both the words "reimbursed" and "reasonable" require that 
the second interpretation of Section 31-41 ~6(b)(ii) be adopted; namely, that 
$12.00 a day is not an unchangeable figure but merely a suggested sum to 
be used if circumstances permit. 
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COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED SINCE THEY ARE BASED ON A FAULTY JUDGMENT 
Si 
Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid within 
thirty-five (35) days after the insurer receives reasonable 
proof of the fact in amount of expenses incurred during the 
period. . . . In the event the insurer fails to pay such 
expenses when due . . . the person entitled to such benefit 
may bring an action in contract to recover these expenses 
plus the applicable in te res t . If the insureif is required by 
such action to pay any overdue benefits and in teres t , the 
insurer shall a l so be required to pay a reasonable attorney1 s 
fees to the claimant. [Emphasis added] 
' • . quires that reasonable proof be furnished the 
insurer . I: ;-.P instant c a s e , the Appellant was furnished with no proof that 
any sum wcu,.. *..!*._ ween reasonably incurred for services which the injured 
minor would have performed. He has already mc^ivprl iripdir.i] bmti'tit/ lor 
his injuries as well a s benefits for any claims for loss of earnings . 
T h e A p p H |. Mil , ii Ihr i out I i i p p m v M l s H I I f M i i i M i l , p«i| i i n \ r nry t hi i in i 
legally required of i t . The cos ts and at torney 's fees awarded by the trial Court 
mi1 hfisc-Ml on inn Mfihinu,'! ii"' iui'liUNI MI ml IlitinI I mi I , Since this judgment. m n Q t 
fall , the costs and at torney 's fees inextricably linked to i t , must fall a s wel l . 
PC >TNT I I I . 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT'S AWARD OF $12.00 
A DAY IS AFFIRMED, INTEREST ASSESSED AFTER THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AT THE RATE OF EIGHT (8%) PERCENT 
NOT EIGHTEEN (18%) PERCENT PER ANNUM, 
Section 15-1-4 I J .C.A. provides as follows]: 
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Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform 
thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the 
pa r t i e s , which shall be specified in the judgment; other 
judgments shall bear interest a t the rate of eight (8%) 
percent per annum. 
Though the No-Fault Statute provides interest at a rate of eighteen 
(18%) percent per annum (Section 31-41-8) , this only applies until the Court 
judgment is rendered. After such judgment, the judgment s tatute s t ipulates 
that eight (8%) percent must be the legal fee chargeable thereafter s ince the 
part ies had not agreed upon any interest r a t e . 
The installment note situation is i l lus t ra t ive . For example, in many 
jurisdict ions if a note bears in teres t a t an annual rate of twelve (12%) percent , 
then, of course , twelve (12%) percent is the amount payable before judgment. 
However, after judgment, the interest fee a s mandated by the particular 
judgment s t a tu te , i s set at the statutory r a t e , which in Utah is eight (8%) 
percent . See Hiller v . Matheny, 81 C o l o . , 459, 256 P. 1081; Rockland - Atlas 
Natural Bank of Boston v . Murphy, 329 M a s s . , 755, 110 N.E.2d 638. 
Section 31-31-8 U . C . A . , like an interest bearing note , provides for 
the interes t rate which an insurer must pay before judgment. However, 
immediately after judgment, the judgment s tatute Section 15 -1 -4 , U . C . A . 
intercedes and es tab l i shes a new interest rate and the eight (8%) percent 
statutorily required l eve l . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing r easons , Appellant respectfully submits that the 
decis ion of the lower Court should be reversed. 
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